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Abstract Using SIPRI’s new consistent database on military expenditures, the paper
examines the economic effects of such spending in the case of the 13 Latin American
countries. Employing both linear and nonlinear tests, the nexus between defence
spending, economic growth, and investment is investigated for the period 1961–2014.
Findings reported herein are not uniformed across all countries included in the sample.
However, as a broad tentative generalization, they seem to be pointing to the absence
of a strong and robust nexus between the variables examined.
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1 Introduction
The empirical assessment of the economic effects of military spending is a
contentious theme that has attracted considerable attention and debate without,
however, the emergence of a robust and unequivocal consensus (inter alia: Alptekin
and Levine 2012; Dunne and Tian 2013; Dunne and Smith 2010; Heo and Ye 2016).
Essentially, the effects of such government outlays can be summarized into three
broad categories: the opportunity cost of the resources allocated to national defence,
encapsulated by the guns vs butter dilemma; demand stimulation; and supply side
effects (inter alia: Dre`ze 2006; Dunne and Tian 2016; Dunne and Uye 2010; Hou
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and Chen 2013; Desli et al. 2016). The growth enhancing effects include increased
employment of idle or underemployed resources, positive externalities, such as
technological advances, that spillover to other sectors of the economy thus
increasing productivity, infrastructure creation, and human capital formation. On
the other hand, such spending can prove to be growth retarding through the
crowding-out of other more productive forms of public spending as well as
investment. Both cross-country and specific country case studies have empirically
probed into this question with mixed findings, as noted above, although the scales
do seem to tilt in favor of a negative net impact on growth (inter alia: Compton and
Paterson 2016; Malizard 2015, 2016; Dunne and Tian 2015, 2016; Kollias and
Paleologou 2016).
The issue of the economic impact of military spending has also been addressed for
Latin American countries. Ramos (2004) finds a positive effect on growth in the case
of Mexico. For Guatemala, Reitschuler and Loening (2005) report findings that point
to a positive and significant externality effect of defence spending at low levels of such
expenditure but not so for higher levels. Using a sample of Asian and Latin American
countries, Murdoch et al. (1997) find that defence is growth promoting but generates
an opportunity cost in the form of displacing other public expenditures that also boost
growth. Stroup and Heckelman (2001) for a group of African and Latin American
countries establish a nonlinear relationship between defence and growth, with the
findings indicating that low levels of such expenditure increase economic growth,
whereas high levels decrease it. Scheetz (1991), in the case of Argentina, Chile,
Paraguay, and Peru, reports a negative effect on macroeconomic variables, such as
growth, investment, and the current account balance. Klein (2004) also reports a
negative net effect in the case of Peru over the period 1970–1996.
Hoping to contribute to the existing body of literature for Latin America by
extending both the time period as well as the sample of countries, this paper
(re)addresses the issue of the economic effects of defence expenditure using
SIPRI’s1 new database (Perlo-Freeman and Sko¨ns 2016; Smith 2016). SIPRI has
recently extended its military expenditure data set that until now provided consistent
data only from 1988 onwards. The new data set2 has consistent defence spending
estimates across countries that in a number of cases date back to 1949. Hence, it
presents researchers with the opportunity to readdress the perennial question of the
economic effects of military expenditure, since it allows to empirically probe into
this issue for an appreciably longer time period compared to the previous studies. In
the case of the Latin American countries, this implies the addition of more than
20 years in the sample period. There are obvious advantages associated with the
availability of consistent and reliable time series with observations that cover longer
periods. They offer the opportunity for researchers to reach more robust and reliable
inferences over a longer time horizon that, in this case, spans both the bipolar and
post-bipolar periods. Hence, better insights may be gained when it comes to the
empirical appraisal of the economic effects of military spending. This paper, using
1 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
2 Before its official public release, this dataset was made available to a number of researchers to use and
evaluate.
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both linear and nonlinear causality tests, examines the economic effects of defence
spending in the case of the 13 Latin American countries. The tests cover the period
1961–2014. The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section contains a
descriptive comparative presentation of the data used, while Section 3 epigram-
matically addresses the role of the military in Latin America from a comparative
perspective in terms of defence burdens and economic performance. In Section 4,
the methodology employed is briefly outlined and the findings are presented and
discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Sample and data snapshots
Dictated solely by data availability, the 13 Latin American countries are included in
the sample: Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela. As
already pointed out, the military expenditure data is drawn from SIPRI’s new
consistent database. In line with the standard practice in the relevant literature, the
defence burden, i.e., defence spending expressed as a share of GDP, is used in the
empirical analysis that follows. The GDP growth rates and gross capital formation
expressed as a share of GDP are drawn from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators’ database. The time period covered is 1961–2014.3 In Table 1, the mean
values of the three variables are presented for each country in the sample both for
the entire period (1961–2014) as well as for sub-periods. Starting from the overall
growth performance, it is the Dominican Republic that exhibits the highest average
growth rate for the entire period (5.29%) followed by Paraguay (4.89%).
Noteworthy is the fact that the mean growth rates of a number of other countries
are above 4% for the whole period—Mexico (4.08%), Brazil (4.39%), Chile (4.3%),
and Ecuador (4.07%)—with El Salvador, Venezuela, and Argentina having the
lowest averages of the group: 2.38, 2.8, and 2.9%, respectively. Not surprisingly,
significant variations in terms of growth performance are recorded from one decade
to the other for all the 13 countries. Worth mentioning, however, is that compared to
the world economy, all the 13 countries have over-performed in terms of growth
rates. The global average growth rate for the entire period was around 1.9%
according to the World Bank data. The 13 Latin American countries of the sample
had mean growth rates that in cases were higher by more than 2% points compared
to the world’s average and 3% points in the case of Paraguay and the Dominican
Republic (Fig. 1). In terms of gross capital formation expressed as a percentage of
GDP, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Bolivia are the three with the lowest averages for
the entire period—15.3, 15.9, and 15.9%, respectively, followed by Paraguay with
an average of 17.5% (Table 1).
We now turn to present briefly the defence burdens of the 13 Latin American
countries both in terms of the averages recorded over the period in question, as well
as in terms of how this variable has fluctuated in the sub-periods, as presented in
3 With the exception of El Salvador where the tests are conducted for 1965–2014 and Bolivia with the
estimations covering the period 1968–2014 due to data availability constraints.
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Table 1. The annual defence budget is the monetary quantification of the resources
allocated to national defence and denotes the costs of the inputs that go into the
production of military capabilities. As suggested in the relevant literature, cohort of
factors determines the level of the resources allocated to the military including
external as well as domestic security considerations, economic constraints, strategic
aspirations, and the ideological and political orientation of the incumbent
government (inter alia: Bove and Brauner 2016; Wang 2013; Dunne et al. 2008).
Expressed as a share of GDP, military expenditure reflects the defence burden of a
country in terms of the inputs that the implementation of national defence policy
absorbs. As a first broad observation in terms of the 1961–2014 averages, it can be
seen that Mexico has the lowest mean value in terms of military spending as a share
of GDP over the entire period (0.6%). Noteworthy, is that the value of Mexican
defence burden has more or less remained constant over the sub-period presented in
the table. The country with the highest average is Chile (4%). Interesting to observe
is that the Chilean defence burden was as high as 6.4% during 1970–1989 and this
probably can be associated with the Chilean junta (1973–1990). For example, in
1982, military spending as a share of GDP in Chile reached 8.9%. Following the
collapse of the regime, it dropped appreciably in the next decades (Table 1). Peru
and Colombia are the next two countries with the highest defence burden: 2.9 and
2.7%, respectively. Although the empirical investigation of the determinants of such
expenditures falls outside the scope of this paper, in the case of Peru, the long-
running territorial disputes with Ecuador as well as domestic security issues
associated with terrorist activity by Sendero Luminoso and the Tupac Amaru












































































Fig. 1 Growth over-performance vis-a`-vis the world average 1961–2014 (Growth rate of the ith country
minus the world average)
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Colombia between government forces, paramilitaries, insurgents, such as FARC,
and crime syndicates, can be cited as explanatory factors of comparatively higher
defence spending (Vargas 2012). However, the overall assessment of the 13 Latin
American countries included in our sample is that in comparative terms, their
defence burden in most cases has been lower than the world average during the
period in question (Fig. 2).
3 The military in Latin America: a bird’s eye view of defence burdens
and growth
A particular feature of Latin American countries is the role that the armed forces
have played in domestic politics (inter alia: Catoggio 2011; Frantz and Geddes
2016; Biglaiser 2002). For reasons of brevity, we focus exclusively on the time
period of our sample and the countries included in it. During 1961–2014, out of the
13 countries of the sample less than a handful—Mexico,4 Colombia, Venezuela, and
the Dominican Republic5—were not directly ruled by a military government. In
fact, the direct or indirect involvement of the military in the political scene of almost
all Latin American countries was for decades an endemic feature of the region and
its legacy has left an indelible imprint in Latin American history. However, as many













































































Fig. 2 Defence burden of Latin American countries compared to the world average 1961–2014 (Defence
burden of the ith country minus the world average)
4 The only country out of the thirteen contained in the sample that has enjoyed uninterrupted
parliamentary rule since the early twentieth century.
5 The Trujillo Era in the Dominican Republic ended with his assassination in 1961.
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American politics, either in the form of direct military rule or military coups, rapidly
withered away towards the late 1980s (inter alia: Norden 1996; Dix 1994). Even
though a plethora of themes related to the role of the military in Latin American
countries could be addressed, we opt to focus onto two of the key variables
examined herein: the defence burden and GDP growth rate in the case of six periods
of direct military rule in five selected countries: Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Peru, and
Bolivia. All five have experienced direct military rule during the period examined
here. Following the 1964 coup, Brazil was ruled by a military government until
1985. Chile between 1973 and 1990 following the overthrow of Salvador Allende’s
government, Peru 1968–1980, and Bolivia when between 1970 and 1982 were also
ruled by successive military juntas. With the exception of a brief spell, Argentina
was also under direct military rule between 1966–1973 and 1976–1983 when the
military government collapsed following the 1982 military defeat by the United
Kingdom.
In Table 2, we present the following statistics for comparison purposes: the
average defence burden (M/GDP) and GDP growth rate during the period of
military rule in the aforementioned countries; the corresponding averages of these
variables for the entire sample of the 13 countries during the same period and the
country’s average defence burden and growth rate for the entire sample period, i.e.,
1961–2014. Thus, we allow for comparisons on two levels. First, on how the
country faired in terms of these two variables vis-a`-vis the entire sample during each
period of direct military rule, and second, how the military rule period compares
with the country’s averages over the entire period. Starting from the defence burden
level, it appears that in most cases, spending on defence expressed as a share of
Table 2 GDP growth rates and
defence spending as a share of




Brazil 1964–1985 2 6.2
Sample’s average 1964–1985 2.5 4.1
Country’s average 1961–2014 1.9 4.4
Chile 1973–1990 6.3 3.4
Sample’s average 1973–1990 2.5 3.1
Country’s average 1961–2014 4 4.3
Argentina 1966–1973 1.7 3.8
Sample’s average 1966–1973 2.2 5.5
Argentina 1976–1983 3.6 1
Sample’s average 1976–1983 2.6 2.7
Country’s average 1961–2014 1.8 2.9
Peru 1968–1980 4.4 3.8
Sample’s average 1968–1980 2.4 5.2
Country’s average 1961–2014 2.9 3.7
Bolivia 1970–1982 2.3 2.7
Sample’s average 1970–1982 2.5 4.5
Country’s average 1961–2014 2 3.1
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GDP was higher during military rule compared to the country’s average for the
entire period. This is the case for Chile (1973–1990), Argentina (1976–1983), and
Peru (1968–1980) but less so for Brazil (1964–1985), Argentina (1966–1973), and
Bolivia (1970–1982) in which cases, the defence burden during military government
is not appreciably higher than the average of the entire period examined here. To put
things into perspective, a comparison with the sample’s average defence burden
during each period of military rule yields a similar picture. In the cases of Chile
(1973–1990), Argentina (1976–1983), and Peru (1968–1980), military spending
expressed as a percentage of GDP is noticeably higher than the sample’s average
during the same period: 6.3% vs a sample average of 2.5% in the case of Chile
(1973–1990), 3.6 vs 2.6% in the case of Argentina (1976–1983), and 4.4% vs a
sample average of 2.5% in the case of Peru (1968–1980). Noteworthy is the fact that
in the case of Brazil (1964–1985), Argentina (1966–1973), and Bolivia
(1970–1982), their defence burdens during military rule were lower than the
sample’s average for the same periods (2 vs 2.5%, 1.7 vs 2.2%, and 2.3 vs 2.5%,
respectively). Although such descriptive analysis falls short from offering robust
inferences than a more systematic empirical investigation would, it nevertheless
coincides with the findings of other studies that have addressed the determinants of
defence budgets in Latin America (inter alia: Looney and Frederiksen 2000, 1988;
Pela´ez 2007). A similarly mixed picture emerges if we compare growth
performance during military rule (Table 2). For example, Brazil’s growth rate
under military government was noticeably higher than the sample’s average during
the same period (1964–1985)—6.2 vs 4.1%—as well as higher than its average
(4.4%) over the entire period examined here. Exactly the reverse is the case for
Argentina (1976–1983). The sample’s average growth rate during the same period
was more than double (2.7 vs 1%) and so was its average over the whole sample
period (2.9 vs 1%). A more diverse picture emerges for the other cases presented in
Table 2. For example, Argentina (1966–1973) significantly underperforms vis-a`-vis
the sample’s average for the same period (3.8 vs 5.5%) but has a higher growth rate
compared to the one of the entire period. A considerable underperformance
compared to the sample’s average growth rate for the same period is also the case
for Peru (1968–1980)—3.8 vs 5.2%—and also for Bolivia (1970–1982)—2.7 vs
4.5%. Chile’s growth rate during the dictatorship (1973–1990) was roughly the
same to that of the sample for the same period (3.4 vs 3.1%). On balance, it appears
that for most of the selected countries shown in Table 2, growth underperformance
vis-a`-vis the sample for the same period is the case during military rule.
4 Methodology: a brief outline
As noted earlier, to examine the economic effects of defence spending in the case of
the 13 Latin American countries of our sample, both linear and nonlinear causality
tests will be employed. For the linear causality, we apply the Granger-causality test
following the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) (hereafter TY). Following Granger’s
(1969) development of the causality test, two shortcomings were identified. One
relates to the specification bias and the other to the presence of spurious regression. As
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explained by Engel and Granger (1987), two series are regarded to be cointegrated if
the linear combination of these two series is stationary, however, every variable is not.
As a result, they stressed that when these two series are non-stationary and
cointegrated, the Granger-causal inference will be biased. In addition, in the
asymptotic distribution framework, Sims et al. (1990) have produced evidence that
when applying the vector autoregressive (VAR) model, we cannot test for the
causality of integrated variables in level form regardless if these variables are
cointegrated. However, the TY applied in this study overcomes those problems, since
it is based on augmented VAR modeling having a modified Wald test statistic
(MWALD), which asymptotically as a Chi-square distribution. Moreover, since the
test used here (i.e., TY) does not require any pre-tests for cointegration, it presents a
better alternative over the traditional Granger-causality test. As Toda and Yamamoto
(1995) explain, their test can be applied regardless of whether a series is I(0), I(1), or
I(2), non-cointegrated or cointegrated of an arbitrary order producing valid estimates.
This is quite suitable in our case, since the economies examined herein reveal several
structural breaks6 in the macroeconomic variables used. Finally, as Kuzozumi and
Yamamoto (2000) suggest, the TY test should be preferred when sample sizes are
small, since the distortions of the small sample properties remain in low levels, given
the potential bias related to the asymptotic distribution of the applied test.
The approach developed by TY employs a modified Wald test for restriction on
the parameters of the VAR (k), where k is the lag length of the model. The TY test is
to artificially augment the correct order, k, by the maximal order of integration, say
dmax. Once this is done, a (k ? dmax)th order of VAR is measured and the
coefficients of the last lagged dmax vectors are ignored (Menyah and Wolde-Rufael
2010).7 Following this approach, the military expenditure (MGDP) and economic
growth (GDP) model is given in the following VAR system:



















c2i ln INVtj þ e1t;
ð1Þ



















m2i ln INVtj þ e2t;
ð2Þ
6 For the identification of multiple breaks see Kapetanios (Kapetanios 2005).
7 For more details see Toda and Yamamoto (1995) or for shortcoming see, Caporale and Pittis (1999) and
Wolde-Rufael (2004, 2005, 2006).
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where ln MGDPt represents countries’ military spending as a share of GDP, ln GDPt
countries’ annual growth rate of GDP, and ln INVt countries’ gross fixed capital
formation as of GDP.8 Support of the growth-enchasing hypothesis suggests a
unidirectional Granger causality running from military expenditure (MGDP) mea-
sure to the annual growth rate of GDP #1i 6¼ 08ið Þ. When we have the presence of
unidirectional Granger causality running from the annual growth rate of GDP to the
military expenditure b1i 6¼ 08ið Þ, it is evident that the conservation hypothesis
holds. On the other hand, when the feedback hypothesis is true, it suggests the
existence of a bidirectional Granger causality between both variables, i.e., military
expenditure and the annual growth rate b1i 6¼ 08ið Þ and #1i 6¼ 08ið Þ. Finally, the
absence of Granger causality between the MGDP and the growth rate b1i ¼ 08ið Þ
and #1i ¼ 08ið Þ implies the existence of the impartiality hypothesis. Moreover, to
overcome the bias of the omitted variable in growth models, a multivariate
framework is applied by incorporating the measures of gross fixed capital formation
in addition to military expenditure and GDP.9 Before we estimate our model and
proceed with the TY test, we apply several diagnostic tests (normality, serial cor-
relation, heteroscedasticity, and the CUSUM and CUSUM of square tests) and we
resort to the use of four unit roots tests to explore the degree of integration of the
variables used in the empirical analysis. Namely, we apply the Augmented Dickey
and Fuller (1979) (ADF) test, the Phillips and Perron (1988) (PP) test, the Kwiat-
kowski et al. (1992) (KPSS) test, and the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test. Finally,
although tTY suggest that cointegration is not required in order for the estimates to
be valid, we apply the Johansen and Juselius (1990) test as robustness check.10
As Brock (1991) illustrates, linear Granger-causality tests can have low power
uncovering nonlinear causal relations, which could also exist among variables. In
addition, the assumption of linear causality may act as a limiting factor when the true
relationship could be nonlinear. Furthermore, since linear methods depend on testing
the significance of suitable parameters only in a mean equation, causality in any
higher order structure cannot be explored Diks and DeGoede (2001). For that reasons,
we examine the nonlinear non-Granger causality. Baek and Brock (1992), to
emphasize the limitations of the linear assumption, suggest a nonparametric statistical
method for detecting nonlinear Granger causality. Whereas, Hiemstra and Jones
(1994) extended their work by introducing a modified test statistic for the nonlinear
causality. In addition, Diks and Panchenko (2006) (hereafter DP) develop a new
nonparametric test statistic for Granger causality which enable us to avoid the
problem of over-rejection observed in the frequently used test proposed by Hiemstra
and Jones. As a result, in our paper, we apply the nonlinear causality test proposed by
Diks and Panchenko (2006) which can be used to detect possible nonlinear causality
relationship between two time series. Following the representation by Diks and




if current and past values of variable X contain information on
8 All variables are in logarithmic form.
9 See Stern (1993, 2000) and Apergis and Payne (2009)
10 However, it must be noted that the TY test can suffer some loss of power since intentionally over-fits
VAR models.
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future values of Y which is not contained in Y and Yt;. In addition, suppose that FX;t
and FY ;t represent for time t the information sets of past observations of Xt; and Yt;,
respectively. Then, for a stationary bivariate time series process Xt; Ytð Þf g; t 2 Z; ,
we can represent formally that Xtf g does not Granger causes Ytf g as
Ytþ1;...;Ytþk
  FX;t;FY ;t
  Ytþ1;...;Ytþk
 FY ;t: ð3Þ
Equation (3) represents the nonlinear Granger-causality test, where ‘*’ indicates
equality in distributions and k 1.11 Then, by following Hiemstra and Jones (1994),





. Under the null hypothesis, Ytþ1 is conditionally independent
of Xt;Xt1; . . .; given Yt;Yt1; . . . For finite lags lX and lY , the conditional indepen-
dence can be tested as
Ytþ1j XlXt ; YlYt
  Ytþ1
YlYt ð4Þ
where XlXt ¼ XtlXþ1 ; . . .;Xt
 
and YlYt ¼ YtlYþ1 ; . . .; Yt
 
. According to Diks and
Panchenko (2006), Eq. (4) represents a statement about the invariant distribution of
the lX þ ly þ 1-dimensional vector Wt ¼ XlXt ; YlYt ; Zt
 
, where Zt ¼ Ytþ1. By dropping
the time index and assume that lX ¼ ly ¼ 1, we can write W ¼ X; Y ; Zð Þ as a random




. Under the null the conditional
distribution ofZ given, X; Yð Þ ¼ x; yð Þ is the same asZ givenY ¼ y. Therefore, we can
restructure (4) by taking into account the joint probability density functions
fX;Y ;Z x; y; zð Þ, where its marginals should satisfy the following relationship:
fX;Y ;Z x; y; zð Þ
fy yð Þ ¼
fX;Y x; yð Þ
fY yð Þ
fY ;Z y; zð Þ
fY yð Þ ð5Þ
suggesting that X and Z are independent when Y ¼ y for each fixed value of y. Diks
and Panchenko (2006) proved that the restated null hypothesis suggests that
q ¼ E fX;Y ;Z X; Y; Zð ÞfY Yð Þ  fX;Y X; Yð ÞfY ;Z Y ; Zð Þ
 
: ð6Þ
By denoting the local density estimators of a dw variate random vector W as







ij ¼ I Wi Wj\e
 
:,12 the test statistic can be presented as
Tn eð Þ ¼ n 1ð Þ
n n 2ð Þ
X
i
f^X;Y ;Z Xi; Yi; Zið Þf^Y Yið Þ  f^X;Y Xi; Yið Þf^Y ;Z Yi; Zið Þ
 
: ð7Þ
For a sequence of bandwidths en ¼ Cnb with C[ 0 and b 2 14 ; 13
 




p Tn enð Þ  qð Þ
Sn
!d N 0; 1ð Þ ð8Þ
11 Most of the times k is equal to 1.
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where !d denotes convergence in distribution and Sn is an estimator of the
asymptotic variance of Tn(). Finally, the test statistic in Eq. (7) for nonlinear
causality is asymptotically distributed as standard normal and diverges to positive
infinity under the alternative hypothesis.13 Before we estimate the nonlinear model,
we must check if the nonlinearity assumption holds, and therefore, we utilize the
BDS test (Brock et al. 1987). Under the null hypothesis, the BDS test implies that
the variables under examination are identically and independently distributed
(i.i.d.). However, under the alternative hypothesis, the test implies that they have
linear or nonlinear dependency.
5 The findings
Examining for linear causality, the ADF and PP unit root and the KPSS stationary
tests were employed to the intercept and trend (Table 3). The results from the ADF,
PP, and KPSS statistics suggest that the variables are integrated of order one I(1).
Furthermore, we apply the Zivot and Andrews test (Table 4) for structural breaks.
The result of that test also indicate that all the series are I(1). Accordingly, all
variables are integrated of order one I(1).
The Jarque–Bera (JB) tests indicate that all residuals are normal distributed,
whereas the Portmanteau test show that there is no serial correlation. Furthermore,
the Arch tests show that there is no heteroscedasticity for all equations in our
analysis. Finally, the CUSUM and CUSUMS of square tests could not verify a
stability violation.14 In addition, the results of the Johansen cointegration test for the
countries are reported in Table 5. The findings suggest that there is a cointegration
vector among the variables. The null hypotheses of zero cointegrating vector r ¼ 0
as well as less than or equal to one cointegrating vector r 1 is rejected at the 5%
significance level for the trace and the maximum eigenvalue statistics. For
robustness check, Table 5 also presents the results for r 2. The findings suggest
that the null hypothesis for r 2 is rejected at the 1 and 5 significance level for the
trace and the maximum eigenvalue statistics (except for the cases of Paraguay and
Peru). The above empirical findings suggest that there is a stable long-run
equilibrium relationship among the variables. To determine the optimal lag length,
the Schwarz Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) used to select the lag length for
our models with the initial lag length set at k = 1 (k = 4 for two countries).
On the other hand, before we estimate the testing for nonlinear causality, we must
check if the nonlinearity assumption holds, and therefore, we utilize the BDS test.
Two are the main parameters to estimate when applying the BDS test, namely, the
embedding dimension m and the distance e. To obtain reliable results, we use a
range of dimensions from 2 to 5. Table 6 presents the results of BDS test. It is clear
from the statistics in Table 6 that the BDS test and the null of i.i.d is rejected for all
13 For more details please see Diks and Panchenko (2006).
14 Due to length limitations and the quantity of the results/tests performed, the results of the above
diagnostic test cannot be presented. However, all the results are available upon request.
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Table 3 Results from the unit root tests
ADF test Perron test KPSS test
Level 1st diff. Level 1st diff. Level 1st diff.
Argentina
lnGDP -3.44** -6.29*** -49.94*** -61.99*** 0.09* 0.03*
lnMGDP -1.99 -4.04*** -9.21 -56.21*** 1.61*** 0.09*
lnINV -2.83 -4.59*** -14.57 -41.87*** 1.17*** 0.04*
Bolivia
lnGDP -2.67 -5.22*** -39.87*** -54.57*** 0.27* 0.05*
lnMGDP -3.73** -4.26*** -12.6 -57.69*** 0.36* 0.14*
lnINV -2.90 -4.16*** -22.48** -51.28*** 0.19* 0.04*
Brazil
lnGDP -3.40* -5.53*** -47.26*** -61.69*** 0.88*** 0.04*
lnMGDP -2.20 -4.09*** -12.88 -52.19*** 0.67*** 0.04*
lnINV -2.51 -4.44*** -19.53** -50.67*** 0.33* 0.03*
Chile
lnGDP -2.42 -5.85*** -57.49*** -73.27*** 0.25* 0.03*
lnMGDP -0.77 -3.59** -3.36 -58.90*** 1.52*** 0.32*
lnINV -2.91 -4.44*** -28.94*** -58.07*** 1.14*** 0.02*
Colombia
lnGDP -3.53** -5.56*** -43.34*** -69.29*** 0.31* 0.02*
lnMGDP -2.13 -3.68** -9.49 -45.49*** 0.96*** 0.05*
lnINV -3.50** -4.66*** -20.15*** -52.56*** 0.43* 0.07*
Dominican Republic
lnGDP -4.32*** -5.55*** -43.48*** -58.19*** 0.18* 0.02*
lnMGDP -1.55 -3.22* -15.60 -48.56*** 2.27*** 0.04*
lnINV -2.72 -4.47*** -18.24* -57.87*** 0.80*** 0.05*
Ecuador
lnGDP -2.94 -6.18*** -51.06*** -69.33*** 0.12* 0.02*
lnMGDP -2.42 -4.54*** -22.25** -62.01*** 0.40* 0.07*
lnINV -4.01** -4.44*** -16.47 -60.26*** 0.94*** 0.07*
El Salvador
lnGDP -3.44* -3.72** -26.04*** -61.39*** 0.43* 0.03*
lnMGDP -1.52 -3.15* -3.43 -42.69*** 0.53** 0.25*
lnINV -3.00 -3.28* -13.28 -45.24*** 0.10* 0.05*
Guatemala
lnGDP -2.45 -3.80** -13.72 -55.08*** 0.41* 0.14*
lnMGDP -3.94** -3.97** -11.06 -50.77*** 0.36* 0.06*
lnINV -2.46 -4.01** -16.80* -55.61*** 0.25* 0.03*
Mexico
lnGDP -4.18*** -6.02*** -35.30*** -55.06*** 0.78*** 0.01*
lnMGDP -3.59** -3.74** -20.25** -69.49*** 0.25* 0.10*
lnINV -2.89 -4.14*** -15.64 -53.71*** 0.44* 0.05*
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data. However, the results suggest that all countries are nonlinearly dependent, as
well as that nonlinear causality testing is appropriate.
In the next step of the empirical investigation, we proceed to the estimation of
nonlinear causality test (DP test), for our model following Bekiros and Diks
(2008a, b). First, we apply the DP test in the raw data (pre-filtering step) to
distinguish the nonlinear interrelationships, and second, we reapply it to the filtered
VAR residuals to examine whether there is a strict nonlinear causality in nature or
not. The value of bandwidth is set to one.15 Finally, the number of lags used for the
nonlinear causality test is lX ¼ lY ¼ 1. The full results from both the linear and
nonlinear causality tests are presented in Table 9 in the appendix. However, given
the BDS results presented previously, we choose to summarize the findings from
Table 9 only for those obtained when applying the nonlinear test. Specifically,
Table 7 presents the findings on the nexus between military spending and growth
rates when we applied the nonlinear causality tests for the raw data and for the
residuals from the VAR specification. Similarly, Table 8 presents the findings on
the relationship governing defence spending and gross capital formation. As a
broad, general observation based on Table 7, it would appear that the dominant
picture is that there is not any bidirectional relationship between military spending
and the countries’ growth rates. Furthermore, the nonlinear findings indicate
unidirectional causality from the growth rates to military spending for the case of El
Salvador and Paraguay. This tentatively can be interpreted that the growth of the
economy allows more resources to be allocate to defence. The effective demand
stimulative effect channel from defence spending to the economy seems to be
indicating the majority of the causality findings for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Table 3 continued
ADF test Perron test KPSS test
Level 1st diff. Level 1st diff. Level 1st diff.
Paraguay
lnGDP -1.90 -4.10** -44.72*** -66.01*** 0.51** 0.02*
lnMGDP -2.40 -3.76** -9.36 -81.82*** 1.88*** 0.12*
Peru
lnGDP -3.81** -5.75*** -42.69*** -60.86*** 0.07* 0.02*
lnMGDP -2.01 -3.61** -12.68 -55.21*** 1.98*** 0.09*
lnINV -2.39 -5.42*** -11.35 -50.83*** 0.81*** 0.15*
Venezuela
lnGDP -2.86 -4.18*** -62.20*** -77.58*** 0.15* 0.02*
lnMGDP -3.88** -5.63*** -38.15*** -54.49*** 1.98*** 0.01*
lnINV -2.39 -4.79*** -19.42* -47.04*** 0.32* 0.03*
***, **, and * Significant at the 1, 5, and 10 levels, respectively
15 Bandwidth values smaller (larger) than 1 result in larger (smaller) p values (Bekiros and Diks
2008a, b).
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Table 4 Results from the ZA unit root tests with a structural break
Variable Level Break 1st diff. Break
Argentina lnGDP -7.67*** 2009 -11.19*** 1975
lnMGDP -7.67*** 2009 -11.19*** 1975
lnINV -3.70 1981 -6.81*** 1963
Bolivia lnGDP -7.02*** 1978 -11.05*** 1970
lnMGDP -5.99*** 1975 -C10.61*** 1976
lnINV -4.36 2003 -8.69*** 2004
Brazil lnGDP -6.57*** 1977 -10.64*** 2013
lnMGDP -5.03* 1987 -8.88*** 1981
lnINV -4.21 1995 -8.12*** 1989
Chile lnGDP -8.94*** 1998 -14.02*** 1965
lnMGDP -5.36** 1970 -9.56*** 1969
lnINV -5.54** 1987 -9.90*** 1983
Colombia lnGDP -6.50*** 1981 -11.72*** 1998
lnMGDP -5.03* 1972 -8.37*** 1977
lnINV -5.29** 1999 -7.58*** 1995
Dominican Republic lnGDP -6.69*** 2003 -10.24*** 1970
lnMGDP -4.60 1987 -9.31*** 1991
lnINV -4.75 1981 -9.36*** 1964
Ecuador lnGDP -8.16*** 1982 -12.68*** 1983
lnMGDP -5.04* 1980 -9.64*** 1984
lnINV -6.49*** 1965 -9.63*** 1966
El Salvador lnGDP -4.82* 1990 -10.54*** 1986
lnMGDP -3.41 1979 -7.41*** 1985
lnINV -4.38 1979 -7.07*** 1978
Guatemala lnGDP -9.82*** 1992 -9.24*** 1993
lnMGDP -5.39** 1992 -8.18*** 1995
lnINV -4.49 2006 -8.49*** 1975
Mexico lnGDP -6.05*** 2001 -9.50*** 2002
lnMGDP -4.83* 2004 -9.90*** 2006
lnINV -5.16*** 1982 -8.16*** 1995
Paraguay lnGDP -8.34*** 1998 -12.44*** 2002
lnMGDP -3.45 2002 -13.59*** 2005
Peru lnGDP -6.56*** 1979 -10.62*** 1978
lnMGDP -5.37** 1975 -10.64*** 2008
lnINV -3.54 1968 -7.42*** 1982
Venezuela lnGDP -8.28*** 2002 -14.41*** 1985
lnMGDP -7.52*** 2010 -10.66*** 2011
lnINV -5.19** 1983 -8.26*** 1990
Break denotes the time of the structure change
***, **, and * Significant at the 1, 5, and 10 levels, respectively
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Chile, Dominican Republic, and El Salvador, and Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela
and the nonlinear for Bolivia, Chile, and the Dominican Republic.
In broad generalization terms, the results on the bidirectional causality
relationship between gross capital formation and military spending are also overall
indicating the absence of strong nexus between the two variables. An exception can
be observed only for the cases of Brazil and Peru in which a bidirectional nonlinear
relationship is observed. A nonlinear causality running from gross capital formation
to military spending is observed for the cases of Argentina, Brazil and Peru, whereas
a nonlinear causality relationship from defence spending to gross capital formation
in the cases of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela, respectively, may be
tentatively interpreted as indicating effects from dual use infrastructure and
technological spillovers.
6 Concluding remarks
A steadily growing body of empirical studies has addressed the subject of the
economic effects of military spending with no unequivocal consensus emerging.
SIPRI’s new consistent database on defence expenditures, which extends the
available time series covering in some cases the entire postwar period, presents the
opportunity to (re)address the issue. This paper set out to examine via linear and
nonlinear causality tests the nexus between defence spending, economic growth,
and investment in the 13 Latin American countries for the period 1961–2014. The
findings reported herein are not uniformed across all countries included in the
sample. Both bidirectional, unidirectional and non-causality were empirically
Table 5 Results of Johansen’s cointegration tests
Trace statistic (ktrace) Maximum eigenvalue statistics (kmax)
r = 0 r B 1 r B 2 r = 0 r B 1 r B 2
Argentina 47.93*** 18.42** 5.17* 32.51*** 15.25** 4.95*
Bolivia 48.61*** 27.30*** 11.11** 21.31** 16.19** 8.31*
Brazil 36.08** 18.19** 5.30* 22.90** 14.89** 4.10*
Chile 33.55** 17.71** 6.60* 21.83** 14.91** 5.02*
Colombia 36.06** 22.28** 4.83* 23.78** 18.45** 3.15*
Dominican Republic 49.15*** 19.46** 4.13* 29.69*** 15.33** 4.00*
Ecuador 41.79*** 17.84** 5.41* 23.95** 14.43** 3.95*
El Salvador 34.64** 19.69** 5.66* 24.94** 17.09** 4.91*
Guatemala 72.53*** 18.44** 5.98* 56.09*** 15.46** 4.51*
Mexico 38.76*** 20.78** 6.77** 22.98** 15.01** 5.20*
Paraguay 19.02*** 9.02** 3.40* 18.01** 9.02** 2.10
Peru 34.19** 18.81** 3.78* 23.38** 15.02** 2.01
Venezuela 31.86** 18.63** 5.04* 22.23** 14.59** 4.15*
***, **, and * Significant at the 1, 5, and 10 levels, respectively, and r is cointegration rank
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Table 6 BDS results
Length in SD (r2) Emdedding dimension
(m)
W statistic of variables
lnGDP lnMGDP lnINV
Argentina 0.5 2 26.85*** 49.77*** 10.76***
0.5 3 40.16*** 65.44*** 9.93***
0.5 4 64.09*** 61.97*** 8.96***
0.5 5 69.38*** 32.30*** 8.28***
Bolivia 0.5 2 3.51*** 6.67*** 2.80***
0.5 3 4.61*** 7.32*** 2.77***
0.5 4 6.41*** 8.38*** 2.38***
0.5 5 7.73*** 8.63*** 2.40***
Brazil 0.5 2 5.59*** 33.99*** 21.48***
0.5 3 7.03*** 22.98*** 23.03***
0.5 4 4.09*** 14.11*** 30.89***
0.5 5 2.72*** 16.47*** 21.02***
Chile 0.5 2 2.61*** 28.13*** 9.03***
0.5 3 0.34 45.92*** 8.97***
0.5 4 4.89*** 2.66*** 5.25***
0.5 5 3.26*** 1.74** 3.51***
Colombia 0.5 2 17.28*** 24.51*** 8.64***
0.5 3 21.33*** 10.42*** 1.96**
0.5 4 20.53*** 6.34*** 5.40***
0.5 5 13.95*** 4.41*** 3.61***
Dominican Republic 0.5 2 9.41*** 16.30*** 38.12***
0.5 3 77.17*** 15.80*** 31.57***
0.5 4 46.01*** 1.19 7.26***
0.5 5 31.35*** 0.74 4.88***
Ecuador 0.5 2 5.29*** 2.21*** 10.36***
0.5 3 6.16*** 4.53*** 6.51***
0.5 4 12.26*** 2.60*** 15.14***
0.5 5 2.93*** 1.70* 10.26***
El Salvador 0.5 2 17.01*** 21.37*** 16.77***
0.5 3 11.88*** 58.81*** 56.65***
0.5 4 59.44*** 58.27*** 62.91***
0.5 5 10.93*** 22.77*** 59.56***
Guatemala 0.5 2 36.04*** 25.84*** 14.63***
0.5 3 37.88*** 37.45*** 19.21***
0.5 4 68.29*** 60.27*** 26.28***
0.5 5 85.52*** 72.97*** 38.56***
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Table 6 continued
Length in SD (r2) Emdedding dimension
(m)
W statistic of variables
lnGDP lnMGDP lnINV
Mexico 0.5 2 1.82** 19.44*** 13.25***
0.5 3 1.42* 17.56*** 4.52***
0.5 4 5.20*** 17.75*** 10.42***
0.5 5 3.47*** 16.61*** 3.74***
Paraguay 0.5 2 10.24*** 59.00***
0.5 3 6.61*** 22.74***
0.5 4 40.09*** 13.70***
0.5 5 3.08*** 9.44***
Peru 0.5 2 5.11*** 32.95*** 32.70***
0.5 3 16.79*** 10.05*** 44.60***
0.5 4 22.65*** 6.12*** 26.54***
0.5 5 15.55*** 4.26*** 18.05***
Venezuela 0.5 2 33.59*** 13.22*** 20.55***
0.5 3 92.57*** 8.82*** 14.91***
0.5 4 66.42*** 5.16*** 13.80***
0.5 5 45.29*** 3.45*** 9.35***
k represents five dimensions; SD equals 0.5
***, **, and * Significant at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively
Table 7 Summary of the nonlinear findings on the nexus between military expenditures and growth
MGDP $ GDP GDP ? MGDP MGDP ? GDP
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established. Yet, as a broad tentative generalization, the prevailing picture is that of
a weak causal relationship. In most cases, no nexus could be statistically traced
albeit, as noted, this is not a universally applicable inference. Clearly, the results
presented above should be treated as a first reassessment of the issue at hand using
the new consistent database constructed by SIPRI. Further empirical investigation is
needed to examine both the determinants of such expenditures in Latin American
countries as well as in order to probe further and in a more detailed manner into the
economic effects of such government outlays.
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Table 8 Summary of the nonlinear findings on the nexus between military expenditures and gross
capital formation
MGDP $ INV INV ? MGDP MGDP ? INV
Raw Data Resid. VAR Raw Data Resid. VAR Raw Data Resid. VAR
Argentina 1
Bolivia









Peru 1 1 1
Venezuela 1
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